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ABSTRACT
Objective: The Health and Social Care Act 2012
(‘HSCA 2012’) introduced a new, statutory, form of
regulation of competition into the National Health
Service (NHS), while at the same time recognising that
cooperation was necessary. NHS England’s policy
document, The Five Year Forward View (‘5YFV’) of
2014 placed less emphasis on competition without
altering the legislation. We explored how
commissioners and providers understand the complex
regulatory framework, and how they behave in relation
to competition and cooperation.
Design: We carried out detailed case studies in four
clinical commissioning groups, using interviews and
documentary analysis to explore the commissioners’
and providers’ understanding and experience of
competition and cooperation.
Setting/participants: We conducted 42 interviews
with senior managers in commissioning organisations
and senior managers in NHS and independent provider
organisations (acute and community services).
Results: Neither commissioners nor providers fully
understand the regulatory regime in respect of
competition in the NHS, and have not found that the
regulatory authorities have provided adequate
guidance. Despite the HSCA 2012 promoting
competition, commissioners chose mainly to use
collaborative strategies to effect major service
reconfigurations, which is endorsed as a suitable
approach by providers. Nevertheless, commissioners
are using competitive tendering in respect of more
peripheral services in order to improve quality of care
and value for money.
Conclusions: Commissioners regard the use of
competition and cooperation as appropriate in the NHS
currently, although collaborative strategies appear more
helpful in respect of large-scale changes. However, the
current regulatory framework contained in the HSCA
2012, particularly since the publication of the 5YFV, is
not clear. Better guidance should be issued by the
regulatory authorities.
INTRODUCTION TO NHS QUASI-MARKET AND
COMPETITION POLICY
This paper reports a recent study of the use
of competition and cooperation by commis-
sioners in the NHS since the coming into
force of the Health and Social Care Act 2012
(‘HSCA 2012’). In order to understand the
context within which commissioners chose to
use combinations of these two mechanisms
to attempt to improve value for money and
quality of services, it is necessary to under-
stand recent developments in the structure
of the NHS quasi-market in England, particu-
larly as they relate to competition and its
regulation.
The NHS was established initially in 1948 as
a hierarchical public organisation. In the late
1980s, a quasi-market, incorporating competi-
tion between providers of care, was seen by
the then Conservative government as the best
form of governance structure for the NHS,
which would improve value for money and
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This qualitative study provides unique, context-
ually rich insight into the views on and the use
of competition and cooperation in commission-
ing in four clinical commissioning groups in
England between 2013 and 2015.
▪ This study uses only four in-depth case studies,
so it may not be representative of all national
developments.
▪ As routinely collected data about the use of com-
petition (or cooperation) in the National Health
Service (NHS) are not currently collated centrally,
the study could not ascertain the extent and
nature of the use of competitive commissioning
in the English NHS.
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quality of care.1 The New Labour government ‘went with
the grain’,2 and retained the quasi-market structures,
despite also focusing on top-down, hierarchical measures,
such as performance targets.3 After the general election
in 2001, there was an increased emphasis on markets and
choice.4–6 The key measures were as follows: (1) Demand
side reform, being enhanced patient choice which was
designed to improve services. It was thought that patients
would avoid underperforming hospitals, and the pros-
pect of losing funding under the cost per case Payment
by Results pricing system (see below) would create incen-
tives to improve quality. (2) Transactional reform: a national
tariff of ﬁxed prices for procedures, known as
‘payment-by-results’ (PbR).7 Each episode of care reim-
bursed (or lost to another provider) would be charged at
national tariff rates. PbR was initially designed to cover
acute hospitals’ work, and it has not been expanded to
community health services (CHS) or mental health ser-
vices (MHS)—which still subject to block contracts,
which amount to ﬁxed budgets in effect.8
(3) System management and regulation: In addition to the
continuing role of the hierarchical, top-down command
and control system run from the Department of Health
(and since 2013, NHS England) in the form of compul-
sory policies, the economic regulation of this system was
undertaken by an arm’s length body, the Cooperation
and Competition Panel (CCP) which advised the
Department of Health in accordance with the Principles
and Rules for Cooperation and Competition (PRCC).9 The
CCP’s recommendations were not legally binding. The
principles included the requirement for ‘providers and
commissioners to cooperate to deliver seamless and sus-
tainable care to patients’ (principle 4), while also prohi-
biting commissioners and providers from reaching
‘agreements which restrict commissioner or patient
choice against patients’ or taxpayers’ interests’ (principle
6). At the same time, aspects of European procurement
law applied to the NHS in respect of two main issues—
procurement by the NHS had to be transparent and non-
discriminatory between different types of providers.
Some commentators believed that European competition
law applied to the NHS during this period, but there
were no cases to test this point.10 The other important
regulator was (and is-see below for its enhanced powers)
the independent regulator of Foundation Trusts (FTs)
(see below) called Monitor.11 (4) Supply side reform: The
ﬁrst reform to the supply side under New Labour was the
introduction of NHS FTs. While FTs are still owned by the
state, they represent a more autonomous organisational
form.12–14 Commissioners were also encouraged to
engage with new providers from the ‘third sector’15 and
for-proﬁt providers were also encouraged to enter the
NHS quasi-market on a larger scale.16
A further wide-ranging set of reforms was introduced
into the NHS under the coalition government (2010–
2015). The relevant aspects of these reforms were
designed to increase the market-like behaviour of provi-
ders of care and they span the coalition government and
current Conservative regime.17 The idea is the same as
that behind previous versions of the NHS quasi-market:
that competition between a wider range of providers will
produce the desired results of improved quality and
greater efﬁciency. The HSCA 2012 made a direct correl-
ation between competitive behaviour in the NHS and
competition law.18 The NHS Procurement, Choice and
Competition Regulations No. 2 2013 (the ‘Procurement
Regulations’) made under the HSCA 2012 include ele-
ments of existing guidance that were not previously
subject to statutory regulation, including the PRCC and
NHS procurement guidelines. The Procurement
Regulations indicate that competitive procurement is to
be preferred. Under the HSCA 2012, Monitor (as the
economic regulator for the whole of the NHS) took over
some of the functions of the former CCP and, along with
the national competition authorities (being, since April
2014 the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA),
and prior to that, The Ofﬁce of Fair Trading, (OFT) and
the Competition Commission (CC)), has powers to
enforce competition law to prevent anti-competitive
behaviour. At the same time, Monitor is also responsible
for promoting cooperation. (HSCA 2012, section 66 (e)).
As Davies18 points out, the provisions of the HSCA 2012
concerning competition are hard to follow and may be
inconsistent. It is the role of NHS commissioners (includ-
ing clinical commissioning groups ‘CCGs’—see following
explanation), however, to ensure that the appropriate
levels of competition and cooperation exist in their local
health economies.17 The HSCA 2012 abolished the previ-
ous NHS commissioning organisations known as primary
care trusts (PCTs) and replaced them with smaller (also)
statutory organisations known as clinical commissioning
groups (CCGs). CCGs are signiﬁcantly different from
PCTs because (as well as covering much smaller popula-
tions), general practitioners (GPs) were in control rather
than NHS managers (with some GP representation) as
was the case for PCTs. This change in commissioner
organisation can be seen as continuing the English
NHS’s policy of surrogate planning, in which a negotiated
order involving micro-commissioning, provider competi-
tion, ﬁnancial incentives and penalties are the dominant
media of commissioner power over providers.19
The Five Year Forward View (5YFV) issued by NHS
England in 2014 did not mention competition between
organisations and instead focused on how organisations
in the NHS need to cooperate with each other, and in
fact at times merge to form larger organisations. The
5YFV has been seen by commentators as an important
indication of the direction of travel for organisational
issues in the NHS.20 The Secretary of State for Health
( Jeremy Hunt) has indicated that patient choice (ie,
competition) may not be the best way to improve many
services.21 On the other hand, Monitor argued that com-
petition still had an important role in the NHS, despite
the 5YFV.22 Importantly, it should be noted that there
have been no relevant legislative changes, so the HSCA
2012 remains in force.
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Need for research on competition in the post-HSCA 2012
NHS
While studies have noted that incentives for competition
and cooperation exist in healthcare, few have researched
the interaction between the two.23 24 At the same time,
extensive research, based on transaction costs theory,
demonstrates that markets are not always the most efﬁ-
cient institutional structures compared with more hier-
archical forms, and this research extends to health
services.25–28 Research indicates that the ﬁrst
Conservative quasi-market (1989–1997) was not entirely
successful.29 30 As Tuohy points out, the internal logic of
the relevant system will affect the implementation of the
policy change.3 Although state hierarchies can make
abrupt strategic changes, they are vulnerable to pro-
blems of delay. In the case of the NHS quasi-market in
the 1990s, the established logic of hierarchical corporat-
ism blunted the effects of the market. Thus, the key to
understanding the NHS quasi-market was (and is) its
institutional context. Analysis of this demonstrates the
persistence of the hierarchical nature of the NHS
during the ﬁrst Conservative government quasi-market
period, as opposed to any marketised elements.2
Researchers found that the incentives to behave in
market-like ways were not robust, and the hierarchical
elements of the NHS under which the Department of
Health was able to issue commands to the lower levels
continued to hold sway.2 3 30
Furthermore, research studies about more recent
incarnations of the NHS quasi-market demonstrate that
it continues to contain very strong hierarchical elements,
despite the increasing series of pro-market reforms since
2001.8 31 It should be noted that there is research about
the effects of competition in New Labour’s version of
the quasi-market, which ﬁnds in favour of competition
in some acute services on efﬁciency and quality
grounds.32 33 Given the paucity of empirical research evi-
dence in respect of the effects of the HSCA 2012, there
is a need to investigate the way in which local health
systems are managed to ensure that cooperative behav-
iour is appropriately coexisting with competition.
(Although Krachler and Greer34 undertook a study of
the relationship between marketisation and privatisation
in the post HSCA 2012 NHS, this focused on market
entry by private providers, rather than NHS commis-
sioners’ behaviour to all providers).
An important aspect of understanding how competi-
tion and cooperation operate together is to investigate
the rules which govern these interactions between people
and organisations.35 In the case of the English NHS,
these rules consist of legislation (primary, ie, acts of par-
liament; and secondary, ie, statutory instruments) and
policies issued by the Department of Health and NHS
England. Some speciﬁc forms of cooperation have been
evaluated (such as integrated care33 and clinical net-
works), but the manner in which local health systems
were being managed to balance competition and cooper-
ation under the HSCA 2012 has not been investigated.
Study of commissioning through competition and
cooperation
In light of the absence of evidence about the operation
of the HSCA 2012 from the view point of CCG commis-
sioners, we undertook a study to investigate how commis-
sioners in local health systems manage the interplay of
competition and cooperation in their local health econ-
omies, looking at acute MHS and CHS. The research
questions were:
▸ How do commissioners and the organisations they
commission from understand the policy and regula-
tory environment, including incentives for competi-
tion and cooperation?
▸ In the current environment, which encourages com-
petition and cooperation, how do commissioning
organisations and providers approach their relation-
ships with each other in order to undertake the plan-
ning and delivery of care for patients?
▸ How do commissioning organisations use or shape
the local provider environment to secure high quality
care for patients? This entails examining how CCGs’
commissioning strategies take account of the local
conﬁguration of providers and the degree to which
they seek to use or enhance competition and/or
encourage cooperation to improve services.
Study design and methods
The study consisted of a series of four in-depth case
studies to investigate how commissioners approached
their roles as shapers of the local health system in
respect of competition and cooperation issues.
The selection of a case study design for this research
was appropriate for several reasons. The research ques-
tions were suited to a qualitative rather than quantitative
approach, and case studies can accommodate these
methods.36 Qualitative research is based on data gener-
ation methods which are ﬂexible and in which categor-
ies are not ﬁxed prior to research, but can alter in
response to the data which are collected. Moreover, case
study designs are thought to be particularly sensitive to
exploring a ‘contemporary phenomenon within its real
life context’ (ref. 36 p. 13), which is what we were
aiming to do. Finally, case studies are thought to be
suited to exploring ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions,36 too
complex for a research design based around an experi-
ment or survey. Thus, the use of case studies was
thought to be the most appropriate research design as
we were able to gather a range of data, including con-
textual information, by concentrating on four speciﬁc
CCGs in England. We were able to pursue our research
questions in depth, informed by two sets of in-depth
interviews and the examination of local documents
(including CCG commissioning strategies and board
minutes). The documents were used to help us ﬁnd out
how the CCGs actually used competition and cooper-
ation in practice and will not be reported on separately
(save for the table indicating the types of services which
were subject to tendering).
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In the ﬁrst phase of the ﬁeldwork, between August
2013 and June 2014, we carried out 33 interviews, 13
with senior commissioners and 20 with provider man-
agers, including independent providers, in four CCGs
across England. The interviews were conducted by a
team of experienced qualitative researchers (DO, ES,
AC, NP and LW) who did not know the participants
prior to this study. Participants were approached by
email or a phone call in the ﬁrst instance, were given
written documentation describing the aims of this
research and given an opportunity to ask questions prior
to giving their consent to participate. Case study sites
comprised a mix of rural and urban settings and were
located in the North, Midlands and outer London (see
tables 1 and 2) in order to obtain a range of experiences
in respect of numbers of local providers and proximity
of other CCGs, as well as different parts of England.
CCG1 was located in the North of England and covered
a population smaller than the average for CCGs in
England. There were areas of high population density in
its largest town and rural areas. There was one main
acute provider, an FT. There were two main CHS provi-
ders one of which was the main acute provider and the
other an NHS trust dedicated to CHS. CCG2 was located
in the middle of England in a large conurbation. There
were several acute providers, many of which were FTs,
with the major provider accounting for just over half of
total acute spend by CCG2. CHS were also provided by
several trusts, as were MHS. CCG3 was located in the
North of England. The diverse population included
large urban conurbations through to rural areas. There
was one main acute care provider, an FT. There was one
main provider of MH and CHS, another FT. CCG4 was
coterminous with an outer London borough. The popu-
lation was served predominantly by the two acute trusts
taking up the bulk of the CCG’s acute spend. Owing to
the density of acute provision in this part of London,
local patients also used other London hospitals. There
was one main NHS CHS provider and two NHS MH
service providers.
The original purpose of the follow-up interviews in
2015 was to ﬁnd out whether there were any changes in
local actors’ understanding of the regulatory regime or
in their use of competition over the passage of time
since the ﬁrst ﬁeldwork phase. Our research design envi-
saged that we would interview fewer people at this stage,
as we were not planning to go into such depth as in the
initial phase, when we wished to investigate actors’
understanding of the new rules. The 5YFV was published
in October 2014 and it was clear that this had the poten-
tial to constitute an important policy change, so we took
speciﬁc note of respondents’ views of its potential and
actual effects in the follow-up interviews. These inter-
views were almost entirely of commissioners, as we were
more interested in their understanding of this policy
change, as any changes in their behaviour had the
potential to shape how competition and cooperation
were used. (However, we took an opportunity which pre-
sented itself to interview one NHS provider).
In the second phase of data collection, between July
and October 2015, we carried out nine follow-up inter-
views with eight commissioners (and one provider) to
gauge any changes in the views and experiences. We
mainly focused on commissioners to gauge the effect on
them of the 5YFV.
Over the two phases, we conducted 42 interviews. The
majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-face in
participants’ workplaces, except in two cases where the
interviews were conducted over the telephone. The inter-
views were conducted in private settings with no non-
participants present. They lasted ∼1 hour and were audio
recorded. Within the four case study sites, participants
were purposively selected to include those managers
most knowledgeable about either the rationales for local
commissioning decisions or providers’ experiences of
competition and cooperation locally. Additional inter-
views with appropriate managers in the relevant organisa-
tions were conducted in order to achieve data saturation.
All but one of the commissioners interviewed were senior
level managers. In one instance, we interviewed a former
GP commissioner. The interviewed provider managers
were all senior managers. They were contracting leads (in
Table 1 Interviews by case study site and phase
Case
study
site
Location
of CCG
No. of first
phase
interviews
No. of
follow-up
interviews Total
CCG1 Rural,
North
10 2 12
CCG2 Urban,
Midlands
9 2 11
CCG3 Mixed,
North
7 2 9
CCG4 Outer
London
7 3 10
CCG, clinical commissioning groups.
Table 2 Interviews by case study site and type
CCG1 CCG2 CCG3 CCG4
Interviews with
commissioners
8 5 3 5
Interviews with providers
NHS
Acute 2 1 2 2
Community 1 2 3 2
Mental health 0 1 0 0
Independent
Acute 0 0 0 0
Community 1 2 1 1
Mental health 0 0 0 0
CCG, clinical commissioning groups; NHS, National Health
Service.
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NHS providers) or chief executives (the latter often
acting as the former in small independent providers).
The interviews explored commissioners’ and provi-
ders’ understanding of policy and regulations regarding
the use of competition and cooperation in commission-
ing NHS services. We also explored their experiences of
tendering and bidding for tenders, as well as collabora-
tive working. The study had received research govern-
ance approval from each participating organisation.
Three authors (PA, DO and ES) agreed a thematic
coding framework derived from the research questions,
the literature on competition and cooperation and the
data. The major themes covered the understanding of
current policy including incentives to cooperate and
compete, views on sector regulators, impact of HSCA
2012 and amount of local discretion, personal views on
the role of competition and cooperation in the NHS
system and speciﬁc examples of competition and cooper-
ation in the local context including the rationale that led
managers to adopt a particular mechanism, including
any barriers and facilitating factors. The interviews were
transcribed, uploaded to NVivo and coded (by DO and
ES) using the agreed coding framework. The principal
researchers (PA, DO and ES) met periodically to check
whether the coding framework was working well and to
agree to any necessary modiﬁcations.
We wanted to obtain comprehensive data on services
which had been competitively tendered in the four case
study sites to understand the extent of marketisation,
and in respect of which types of services. There was no
single source of such information. We used our inter-
views, case study sites documents, public procurement
databases and email correspondence with commis-
sioners to collect it. We were able to build an indicative
list of services, which were put out to tender by the
CCGs or their immediate predecessors, which is con-
tained in table 3 below. This list needs to be treated with
caution, as it may not be comprehensive.
RESULTS
Understanding and experience of regulatory framework
under HSCA 2012
As actors’ understandings of the rules under which they
operate are crucial in determining their behaviour, parti-
cipants were asked about their understanding of policy,
guidance and the regulatory framework regarding the
use of competition and cooperation in commissioning
NHS services.
Commissioners in each site considered the current
policy confusing as they were expected to drive competi-
tion and integrate services, which they found to be
contradictory:
Those two drivers can compete against each other.
(Commissioner 3, CCG4, May 2014)
Some commissioners were awaiting guidance on how
to implement policy, or commented that where there
was guidance, interpretation was likened to ‘trawling
through treacle’ (Commissioner 1, CCG1, May 2014).
This commissioner considered that the ambiguity led to
people overcomplicating policy implementation.
When asked about their understanding about whether
the current policies required them to tender all services,
commissioners were convinced that this was not the
case. There was a consensus that although there was no
mandate to tender all services, there was a requirement
to justify the occasions when competitive procurement
was not pursued.
We don’t have to tender all services, there are exceptions.
But I think the default position is that we are expected to
tender services, as a generality. So we have to, I think, the
expectation is that you will explain why you haven’t.
(Commissioner 1, CCG2, November 2013)
Lack of explicit, unambiguous guidance, about the
role of competition in commissioning clinical services,
could in some cases play to commissioners’ advantage
by increasing their freedom. However, it also increased
the freedom of providers to challenge commissioning
decisions and/or to interpret the regulatory uncertainty
to their advantage. A commissioner from CCG1 cited a
case of a private provider offering maternity services in
the region and expecting to be paid by the local CCGs
despite not being commissioned by the CCGs. Such pro-
vider behaviour, driven by patient choice and effectively
bypassing commissioners, undermined the level of
control commissioners had over their local health econ-
omies. In general, the interviewee remarked that often
commissioners’ strategy was to comply with the national
framework but immediately ﬁnd ways round it to adapt
to the local circumstances (Commissioner 1, CCG2,
November 2013).
Provider managers were also confused about the
meaning of the competition rules. They echoed commis-
sioners’ concerns about the vagueness and complexity
of the formal rules and a need for better guidance.
The lack of sufﬁciently speciﬁc guidance about the
HSCA 2012 resulted in commissioners having to consult
sector regulators. Commissioners were often quite crit-
ical of the role of sector regulators, mainly due to their
alleged inability to provide clear guidance in particular
cases. One commissioner expressed the view that sector
regulators (as interpreters of national policy) could not
decide whether the priorities lay with increasing compe-
tition or with fostering integration among providers.
Such a view was a consequence in part of the decision to
reject a merger proposal between the Royal
Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust and Poole Hospital NHS Foundation
Trust hospitals taken in October 2013 by the CC, which
sent shock waves through commissioning world.
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You know, the debacle of Poole and Bournemouth,
crikey. You know, 10 years ago that merger would have
just happened. They’d have done a public consultation
and whatever, but it would have just happened because it
was the right thing from a quality patient side of things
and the right thing from a commercial viability, and
recognising really in Poole and Bournemouth, (…),
there’s no choice. (Commissioner 3, CCG1, April 2014)
Another CCG1 commissioner expressed their disap-
pointment over the lack of clear guidance from Monitor
after the CCG came across the private maternity pro-
vider billing them for activity which had not been con-
tracted (as mentioned above). Monitor’s stance was seen
as ‘very wishy-washy’ and their interventions were not
‘effective’ or ‘timely’ (Commissioner 4, CCG1, April
2014).
A further complex issue on which the CCGs wanted to
consult the regulators related to opening up services to
competition when these services were not a commission-
ing priority. Commissioners from CCG1 were
approached by potential providers (in this case a GP
practice) wishing to provide CHS when the
commissioners were not prioritising this issue. (In fact,
the question of a GP practice wanting to provide CHS
was problematic for other reasons: CCGs are GP mem-
bership organisations, giving rise to potential conﬂicts of
interest due to GPs’ dual role as commissioners and pro-
viders of services.) In another case, a commissioner
from CCG3 was concerned that Monitor might inter-
vene and put a stop to the ‘controlled market approach’
which CCG3 pursued (Commissioner 1, CCG3, August
2013). The worry remained that if one were forced to
follow a strict interpretation of the rules, decisions such
as not putting some services out to tender, would not be
allowed.
In common with commissioners, the regulation of the
health sector was seen as muddled by provider man-
agers, with Monitor having conﬂicting duties. One felt
that the relationship between the different regulators
was not clear and there was no overall organisation
responsible for regulation:
The interactions between the different regulators is con-
fused. No, there used to be … an organisation that was
Table 3 Indicative list of services tendered in the four case study sites (year of tender, where available; and value, where
available)
CCG1 CCG2 CCG3 CCG4
Two aspects of Diabetic
retinal screening (2009,
£110–£130 K; and £350–
£450 k)
Dental services (2009,
£2.6 m)
Clinical pharmacy support
(2009, £500–£700 K per
annum)
Lymphedema service (2009,
£700–£900 K)
Substance misuse (2009)
Independent sector
Treatment centre (2009)
Community oxygen (2010)
Intermediate care (2010)
AQP podiatry (2012)
Orthodontics (2012, £3 m)
Intermediate care (2015)
Diabetes service (2015)
AWP Chronic Disease
Self-management Programme
(2009, £200–£500 K)
Continuing healthcare (2010)
Urgent care transport (2010)
Breastfeeding peer support
(2011, £150–£180 K)
Sexual Assault Referral Centre
(2012, £960 K)
AWP smoking cessation (2012,
£600–£790 K)
Pathology laboratory (2012,
£1.8–£2 m)
AQP Podiatry (2012)
AQP Adult hearing (2012)
AQP Wheelchairs (2012)
Intermediate care (2013, up to
£500 K)
Palliative Care (2013, £36 K)
Assisted conception (2013,
c. £8.5 m)
A nationally required new service
(2014, £45–130 m, joint with other
CCGs in the region)
Termination of pregnancy (2014,
£5.3 m)
End-of-life care service
Diagnostics, care and treatment
Home oxygen
Drug and alcohol treatment
GP-led urgent care
centre (2009)
Wheelchairs (2013)
Community
ophthalmology (2013)
Midwifery (2014)
AWP community
endoscopy
ISTC
Health and social care
transport ( joint
national)
Care homes ( joint
regional)
Urgent care transport
( joint national)
Urgent care centre (2008,
£500 K-£2 m)
GP-led health centre (2009, £3–
5 m)
Drug and alcohol services
(2011, £4.8 m)
Primary mental Health(2011,
£3.3 m)
Chlamydia screening (2011,
£1.8–£2.4 m)
Speech and language therapy
(2012, £1.8 m)
Smoking cessation (2012,
£1.1 m)
NHS 111 pilot (2012,
£880 K-£1.3 m)
Clinical assessment service—
telephony booking and
management service (2012,
c. £200 K)
Health improvement (2012,
c. £1.2 m)
AQP MSK (2012)
AQP Podiatry (2012)
Rehabilitation support (2013)
Ophthalmology
Phlebotomy
AQP, any qualified provider; AWP, any willing provider; CCG, clinical commissioning groups; ISTC, Independent Sector Treatment Centre;
GP, general practitioner; MSK, musculoskeletal service; NHS, National Health Service.
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clearly responsible for … holding the ring, in the shape
of SHAs [Strategic Health Authorities], that’s disap-
peared. (Provider 2, NHS, acute, CCG2, March 2014)
An independent provider manager noted that
Monitor did not show much interest in the place of
small providers in the NHS market, and was focusing its
attention on large NHS acute hospitals.
Changes in understanding of the regulatory framework
after the publication of The Five Year Forward View
Commissioners in all the case study sites, who were rein-
terviewed in 2015, after the publication of the 5YFV,
noted a change in tone of national policy messages
towards greater promotion of collaboration in commis-
sioning. They thought that the 5YFV legitimised local
cooperative initiatives aiming to transform services and it
allowed them greater latitude in deciding whether to
tender out services. However, at the same time, commis-
sioners pointed out that none of the underlying rules
guiding procurement of clinical services had changed as
a result of the 5YFV and warned that the rules could not
be disregarded completely.
I think over the last 12 months, it’s almost as an unwrit-
ten rule there does seem to be a relaxing of the rules
around the need to go to full procurement. If you can
demonstrate it’s in the best interests of the patient, you
can stick with your local patch and it is seen to be almost
an unwritten rule, and if you ask me to go and ﬁnd a
document that says this is how you should do, I’d strug-
gle, but it’s how everyone seems to be operating now.
(Commissioner 1, CCG3, July 2015)
The different national bodies, some in favour of
cooperation (NHS England) and some still promoting
the use of competition (Monitor) were sending conﬂict-
ing messages. Most of the reinterviewed commissioners
saw a need for competition to remain available to them
as a commissioning tool to use at their discretion.
The follow-up interview we conducted with one of the
providers in 2015 highlighted many important changes
in the way providers perceived the rules in respect of
competition and cooperation in commissioning of the
NHS services compared with 2013/14. This interviewee
noted that the publication of the 5YFV did not change
his understanding of the policies and rules about the
use of competition in commissioning. However, it had
encouraged, and to an extent legitimised, collaborative
ways of working. Different providers, and the CCG4 CHS
trust in particular, had been increasingly engaging in
testing the rules by getting together and working more
collaboratively, pushing ‘the art of the possible’
(Provider 5, NHS, community and MH, CCG 4 October
2015). Such grassroots local developments driven by the
genuine pressing concerns over costs and quality of ser-
vices tended to override strict interpretations of the legal
framework that so far remained unchanged.
Use and experience of competition and cooperative
mechanisms
In order to understand how competition and cooper-
ation were used locally in our case study sites, we investi-
gated the major service delivery issues, so that we could
see how they were approached.
The urgent need to ﬁnd savings had been made clear
by NHS England in July 2013 and dominated local
agendas. Each case study site was engaged in efforts to
move care out of hospital into the community, in the
hope that money would be saved.
The game-changer is going to be the Call to Action, 30
billion [funding gap]. There’s got to be major strategic
change of hospital services and delivering care in the
community, sustaining people and people sustaining
themselves through self-care. We just haven’t got the
money and we’re not going to. (Commissioner 1, CCG4,
November 2013)
In order to tackle these big service reconﬁguration
challenges, the four CCGs were generally exploring col-
laborative approaches. Commissioners on the whole
took the route of coordinating cooperation between
themselves and providers. They did not use competitive
processes to make major changes. The complexity of the
issues involved in such reconﬁgurations required an
iterative approach using a series of meetings with local
providers at which actors were encouraged to come to a
collective agreement about how changes would be
made.
Commissioners in all sites were exploring the option
of using outcome-based commissioning approaches as
well as lead provider models for a range of different ser-
vices. In two sites—CCG4 and CCG1—the outcome-
based commissioning approach was going to be used to
redesign the provision of CHS. Commissioners hoped
that prime provider models and outcome-based con-
tracts would remove cost pressures associated with the
‘open chequebook’ (Commissioner 3, CCG1, April
2014) pricing structure of PbR by moving to capitated
budgets. These new organisational models were likely to
reduce the amount of local choice available to patients
by the formation of larger organisations and the reduc-
tion in the number of possible organisations to choose
from. Although these approaches could have involved
competitive tendering, they did not do so in our case
study sites. Instead, providers were encouraged to stop
treating themselves as ‘little entities’ in a competitive
game looking after their own interests and to start to
acknowledge that lack of money in the local health
system required a change of mentality (as well as more
efﬁcient processes). The way our case study sites
embarked on tackling such challenges was by talking
with existing providers, gathering intelligence and data
needed for service reviews, assessing the performance of
services and areas that required change and ﬁnally
looking for contractual levers to use to deliver the
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change. Going to the open market was seen as an
option of last resort in respect of big service delivery
transformations, and collaborative methods were
preferred.
Although competition was not used to bring about
large-scale service reconﬁgurations, commissioners in
our case study sites did use competition for the market,
using competitive tendering, in respect of smaller ser-
vices. Table 3 contains an indicative list of services,
which were put out to competitive tender in the four
CCGs or their PCT predecessors. It shows that the ser-
vices, which were put out to tender, were mostly primary
care, community and diagnostic services. Individual ser-
vices delivered in acute hospital settings were not often
tendered, and no services in a whole hospital had been
subject to competitive tendering. Commissioners in
CCG3 indicated that their local health economy culture
was a collaborative one, and that they did not wish to
use competitive methods, if they could be avoided.
We asked commissioners to tell us about their experi-
ences of tendering out a service, once they had decided
on this route. Some commissioners stressed the import-
ance of testing the market prior to issuing a formal invi-
tation to tender. This was seen as necessary to ascertain
provider interest in order to avoid the situation of
having to go through a costly tendering process to end
up with the same or a worse quality provider. Hosting
provider engagement events was seen as a way to gauge
provider interest and served as a general tool for mobi-
lising existing providers to improve their performance.
The use of adverts and market engagement events was a
warning sign for incumbent providers that they ought to
take commissioners seriously.
The decision to procure something in terms of any
service, no matter what it might be, does sort of stimulate
the market and people then start to look at—to you as
an organisation, knowing that, you know, you use—you’re
using a procurement route more than you won’t, in
terms of delivering services. (Commissioner 2, CCG2,
December 2013)
When assessing the bids, commissioners applied a
number of criteria to assess the suitability of potential
providers. In particular, they looked at whether providers
were ﬁnancially sustainable and capable of delivering
the service.
Quality, value for money, safety, governance. What else
would you look for? Whether the capabilities of whether
somebody’s big enough to deliver it, if it’s big? If we’re
talking about the community services, if it was are they
big enough? Have they got the track record? So have
they got expertise in this area? (Commissioner 4, CCG1,
April 2014)
Commissioners from CCG4 stated that they would
have made more use of competitive tendering to
procure services but felt constrained by the lack of
resources to run such processes. One commissioner
noted that one would need ‘a whole army of people’ to
use competitive procurement on a large scale
(Commissioner 3, CCG4, May 2014).
I would be more aggressive and probably more prone to
tendering if I had more resource devoted to it and I
would be moving resource from serious redesign or basic
commissioning function into procuring and doing things
in a more structured market interventionist way.
(Commissioner 1, CCG4, November 2013)
Most commissioners noted how time consuming and
expensive tendering was. The CCG4 commissioner
reﬂected on the high costs of the primary care MHS
procurement.
We did it in-house led by the Commissioning Manager
for Mental Health, but we had two Project Managers, you
know, it wasn’t cheap to do this. And in total, we prob-
ably—I think we spent a quarter of a million pounds
doing the speciﬁcation, the involvement and then the
procurement. You know, most of it was on salaries for the
Project Managers and legal cost in terms of getting
expert advice from [legal ﬁrm], to make sure we ran the
process. You’ve got to get it right, because you could be
challenged. [The incumbent provider] tried to challenge
us and we had to send them all the documentation.
(Commissioner 1, CCG4, November 2013)
We also asked providers about their experiences of
participating in a tendering exercise. They reported that
tendering was very resource intensive for them, and that
it was made more difﬁcult by the lack of experience of
many commissioners. This affected the efﬁciency of the
processes. Moreover, several providers were concerned
that commissioners were relying on them to provide
information required to write the tender speciﬁcations,
rather than being able to do this themselves. Many provi-
ders noted that commissioners were still not able to
specify the service at later stages of the process, and
relied on each provider tendering to give details about
what the service should comprise.
Furthermore, market engagement exercises were
described as a ‘courting process’ which was difﬁcult to
manage from the incumbent provider’s point of view.
The provider was trying to convince the commissioner
that tendering the service was not necessary, but at the
same time trying to remain part of the tendering
process. It was a difﬁcult balancing act for an acute pro-
vider, which wanted to maintain their chances of
winning the bid, knowing that at the same they might
disclose something that would feed into the service spe-
ciﬁcation and work to their disadvantage.
The level of trust that, you know, how open you are and
how much you’re giving to a speciﬁcation because if you
give too much, they use that for the speciﬁcation that
someone else can then win for. So it’s quite a difﬁcult
one. (Provider 4, NHS, acute, CCG3, December 2013)
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Once the formal tendering process was underway, it
was characterised by one provider as ‘chaotic’ due to the
short notice periods for submitting the paperwork. A
common complaint was the large amount of resources
that NHS providers had to dedicate to pursue competi-
tive tenders.
We lose sight of while every provider’s bidding for this
work the resource involved to answer them and particu-
larly the stages depending on what process they use is
substantial. So, you know, you’ve got a pre-qualiﬁcation
questionnaire, then you have an invitation to tender,
then you have a presentation, then you’ve got mobilisa-
tion. And the amount of resource and ﬁnancial input
into them is signiﬁcant and you question how much that
beneﬁts the patient. The outcome possibly does but if
you’ve had seven organisations doing that and only one
is successful. (Provider 4, NHS, acute, CCG3, December
2013)
In fact, some providers could not afford to bid, due to
their poor ﬁnancial situations.
I think the challenges are making sure that you have suf-
ﬁcient money to invest in bidding for things, because it
takes a lot of time and effort, particularly from an
Operational Team, a Clinical Team, but also the ﬁnance
and information you support. And traditionally, you
know, ‘cause we don’t have any money, we’re poor, we
don’t have a budget set aside, so you’re asking people to
do it on top of their normal job. (Provider 4, NHS,
acute, CCG4, April 2014)
Often the information released by commissioners was
not sufﬁcient for a provider to make a cost beneﬁt
assessment before deciding whether the tender would
be viable.
We’ve recently bid for a [XX] service in [locality X], now
we made a tactical decision in doing that to actually mas-
sively inﬂate the costs, the price, because the case mix
information on the service was none existent, so they
told us the kind of service they want, they couldn’t tell us
how many of what, well, I mean, again, it’s just…as far as
I’m concerned, it’s appalling! (Provider 5, NHS, acute,
CCG3, December 2013)
As part of our research into how commissioners were
using competition in the NHS, we investigated whether
CCGs had a strategy to develop the market for non-NHS
independent providers. This is an interesting question
because it indicates the extent to which commissioners
saw competition as a method of increasing diversity of
supply. None of the sites had a deliberate strategy to
enable greater involvement by for-proﬁt providers in the
provision of services. Instead, they appeared as contrac-
tors to the NHS on an ad hoc basis.
We’ve used the independent sector to develop services
that are substitutional for secondary care, or to outplace
secondary care services. We’ve used them equally for
some aspects of what’s traditionally been community pro-
vision. So it’s case by case. I don’t think we have a—there
isn’t a kind of an overarching policy imperative to either
grow or restrict the private sector. We use it where it’s
relevant. (Commissioner 1, CCG2, Nov 2013)
Some commissioners were at pains to point out that
they were careful to treat all providers equally, irrespect-
ive of whether they were NHS or not. One CCG (CCG4)
was more enthusiastic about their entry into the NHS
quasi-market than the others. On the other hand, all of
the CCGs were actively engaged in supporting local
third sector organisations. Providers did not agree that
they were all treated equally, and, in particular, some
independent providers complained about being at a dis-
advantage. It appeared that, on the whole small and
medium size independent providers did not experience
the same level of communication and engagement from
commissioners as larger independent providers or NHS
trusts.
The two [NHS] trusts are kept informed but we’re just
treated terribly, I would say. We’re not kept informed
with things, although they do come to us often if they
need—for instance, the hospital were under pressure,
winter pressures, and they didn’t have enough doctors.
The commissioner came and said, I wonder, could you
put some of your GPs in there just for the next fortnight,
just to take some of the pressure off A&E? They’ll do that
all the time but they won’t keep us informed about any-
thing else that’s going on around our contract, et cetera.
(Provider 6, independent, CCG3, March 2014).
Apart from a speciﬁc local commissioning climate
created by their main commissioning CCG (eg, in
CCG3, where the commissioners did not favour the use
of competition), the different types of providers (acute,
CHS and MHS) faced different constraining factors.
Many of these constraints were determined at the
national level, importantly, different pricing mechanisms
for different types of services. Furthermore, owing to
their different sizes, and types of services being deliv-
ered, the market horizon of some providers stretched
beyond one particular CCG area to other CCGs and to
markets created by different types of commissioning
bodies, for example, local authorities. Thus, the position
of a particular provider within the NHS was a product of
the number of factors such as the nature of the local
market, the type of services they provided and whether
they were able to reach to other markets.
Providers in our sites had a ﬁrst-hand experience of
how the principles of competition and cooperation
worked together in healthcare delivery practice.
Providers had to comply with dual incentives to cooper-
ate and compete with other providers in the system and,
importantly, to engage with commissioners in service
planning. This led to circumstances in which providers
sometimes collaborated with their competitors and
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competed with their collaborators. This applied to all
types of providers, including independents.
Providers expressed concern about barriers preventing
fair competition. One important issue was the different
pricing mechanisms for acute and out of hospital care.
An interviewee contrasted the position of MHS (which
had block contracts, effectively a ﬁxed budget) with that
of the acute trusts, which could expand their provision
due to being paid on a cost per case basis through PbR.
A third of our Trust is Specialists, mostly Secure Services.
But we can’t say, “We’re fantastic at Secure Services, we’ll
take ﬁve more patients,” and get paid for it, because
we’re just on a block [contract]. So we’ve got no way of
ﬂexing up on services that we’re good on. If you work in
[local acute trust], big, gleaming, enormous university
hospital, and they decide, “Actually, we’ve got some real
Specialists in trauma,” and the Air Ambulance starts
ﬂying people in from [locality X] who have trauma, they
may not get exactly the money that they want, but no
one turns round to them and says, “We can’t pay you for
that”. (Provider 1, NHS, CHS and MH, CCG2, April
2014)
Whether competing or cooperating in respect of
gaining (or trying not to lose) patients, all providers
noted that they cooperated at the clinical level, to
ensure that patients moved smoothly between organisa-
tions. Other reasons for collaborating included partner-
ships to deliver non-clinical services, participating in
local service transformation programmes and forming
partnerships to compete together for tenders.
Many interviewees distinguished between being
‘forced’ to compete or ‘forced’ to cooperate by different
parts of NHS organisational hierarchy and choosing to
compete or cooperate because of the provider’s internal
decision-making. Top-down ‘enforced’ competition
seemed to have affected CCG commissioners and provi-
ders and was viewed as counterproductive.
They tried tendering Pathology, but that was an interest-
ing example because that was being forced by the old
Strategic Projects Team in [one region] Health Authority,
and it was—it’s fascinating as an exercise. (…) They tried
imposing the same sort of model in the [region of
CCG2], and so long as an SHA was there to wave the big
stick, the PCTs played along with it. And 6 months after
the SHAs were abolished, the CCGs said, “No, we’re not
going to do that anymore. We never wanted to do it in
the ﬁrst place. You were forced—you forced us into it.”
There’s a huge degree of inertia in all parts of the
system. (Provider 2, NHS, acute, CCG2, March 2014)
In addition to understanding how providers competed
and cooperated with each other in our case study sites,
it was important to understand providers’ perceptions of
their relationships with the commissioners. We found
that, in different circumstances, providers experienced
threats of competition and encouragement to collabor-
ate with the commissioners and each other. They took
the view that both of these techniques were being used
by commissioners to inﬂuence their behaviour, and thus
improve services. Providers of services out of hospital
were more susceptible to threats of tendering than acute
providers. CHS and MHS providers thought that the
balance of power rested ﬁrmly with the commissioners.
This is because CHS were more likely to be put out to
tender and because block contract payments prevented
expansion of services on providers’ initiative.
The commissioner has all the power here because they
can tender. And if I don’t win the tender, I lose it.
(Provider 1, NHS, community and/MH, CCG2, April
2014)
However, all types of providers could see the advan-
tages of being encouraged to collaborate, and of having
good working relationships with their commissioners.
These might even obviate the need for commissioners to
put services out to tender.
Changes in behaviour following the publication of The
Five Year Forward View
The 5YFV (2014) emphasised the need for NHS organi-
sations to cooperate with each other, and did not appear
to favour the use of competition as a mechanism to
improve services.
The follow-up interviews conducted in the latter part
of 2015 painted a mixed picture of commissioning prac-
tices in the four case study sites. On the one hand, all
the case study sites were undertaking major local service
transformation using collaborative working with provi-
ders (and had been doing so before the 5YFV was pub-
lished). Interviewed in 2015, the CCG2 commissioner
stated that collaboration was their default approach, ‘a
kind of way of life’ which was ‘punctuated by odd
moments where I have to formalise things…on occasion
into contractual or permanent or competitive relation-
ships’ (Commissioner 1, CCG2, July 2015).
On the other hand, three out of four sites (apart from
CCG4) were using competitive tendering to procure
some smaller, more peripheral services. CCG4 did not
rule out doing so in the future. This use of competition
included CCG3, which had not undertaken any competi-
tive procurement on its own in 2013/2014, and had
been the least keen to do so at that time. By 2015 CCG3
had also been using a full procurement route for com-
missioning some of the services which experienced
‘poor quality, poor outcomes’ issues (Commissioner 1,
CCG3, July 2015) or in order to increase patient choice.
It was the ﬁrst time we’ve ever done this within [CCG3
area], a full procurement. So it went out to tender and a
preferred provider was appointed, not [the local acute
provider], although to be fair to [the local acute pro-
vider], they’ve now come to the table and are working
with the new provider, but as a result of that, we have
created a much better service for the patients because
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it’s more locally focused. It’s not hospital focused.
(Commissioner 1, CCG3, July 2015)
This CCG3 commissioner had found the competitive
approach useful in this case as it injected new ideas into
a ‘very conservative’ local landscape. (Commissioner 1,
CCG3, July 2015). Another CCG3 commissioner did not
exclude the possibility of competitive tendering being
used in future commissioning (Commissioner 2, CCG3,
October 2015).
Although noticing shifts in policy rhetoric towards
cooperation following the 5YFV, in their day-to-day prac-
tices, commissioners were exercising their own judge-
ment and making use of all tools available to them. In
fact, taking account of CCG3, we can see that, over time,
a wider range of commissioning mechanisms were being
used.
Competition was being used alongside work on
various projects to integrate services. However, the
problem was how to integrate different integration work
streams under one strategy.
You’ve got to understand how many bids there are going
on, and that’s the confusing thing. We’re a pioneer.
[Acute trust] are a vanguard for the care homes. I
believe they’ve got a bid in as well with a group of other
providers around something else, and there’s so many
things going off at the moment it’s hard to keep a track.
(Commissioner 1, CCG1, August 2015)
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The study has certain limitations. First, as the study
design consisted of four in-depth case studies, it is not
possible to generalise to the whole NHS. In particular, it
should be noted that none of the CCGs in our study
had decided to use competitive tendering to achieve
major service reconﬁguration but national information
(mainly reported by the Health Service Journal) indicates
that some CCGs had done so, although with variable
results. (For example, see the history of the NHS owned
Hinchingbrooke Hospital, the whole of which was put
out to tender and run by a for proﬁt company, Circle.
By 2015, Circle had withdrawn from the franchise con-
tract because it was unable to achieve the ﬁnancial
savings it had promised the NHS, and the hospital’s ser-
vices had been subject to critical inspection reports by
the Care Quality Commission (CQC). On the other
hand, some major tenders appear to have been more
successful. For example, in 2014 Circle was awarded a
5-year £120 million musculoskeletal (MSK) contract by
Bedfordshire CCG and a consortium of NHS and inde-
pendent providers won a £210 million MSK contract in
Sussex.)
Second, it was not possible to ﬁnd the full details of the
tenders undertaken in our four case study sites, due to
the very poor quality of routine data available. This
problem affects the whole of the English NHS and
means that one cannot ascertain with any certainty the
extent and nature of the use of competitive commission-
ing across the NHS, nor the extent of market entry by
independent providers. The possibility of generating evi-
dence about the NHS is compromised, and thus the
ability to make evidence-based policies.
Finally, it should be noted that we did not collect com-
parative data about the amount of resources available to
be spent on procurement in each case study CCG. We
were therefore unable to speculate about whether there
were differences which might have affected the CCGs’
behaviour, in addition to other factors such as local
market structure and attitudes of senior commissioning
staff.
Our ﬁndings concerning the lack of clarity of the
regulatory regime for local actors are important. As
Ostrom points out, actors need to understand the rules
of the game in order to know how to relate to each
other, and these rules are vital in setting the context and
limits within which local actors can operate.35 As we
have shown, the interpretation of these rules by regula-
tors, national authorities and local actors were not clear
to participants and changed over time. This ﬁnding sup-
ports those of Krachler and Greer.34 It remains govern-
ment policy (as well as being enshrined in the European
procurement regulations), that there should be a ‘fair
playing ﬁeld’ for all providers of care to NHS patients in
order to enable the quasi-market to operate effectively,
with the aim of producing efﬁcient high-quality care.37
One prerequisite for such a ‘fair playing ﬁeld’ is that all
actors understand the rules governing that market. It is
also important that commissioners actually treat all pro-
viders equally, which our study indicated they were not
doing at all times (as Krachler and Greer34 also found).
It is not surprising that commissioners and providers
used a judicious mixture of competition and cooper-
ation in their dealings with each other. This behaviour is
common in most markets for complex goods and ser-
vices.38 39 One of the important reasons for doing so is
to reduce transaction costs, as our participants
explained. This links directly to the arguments made by
eminent institutional economists23 24—there are certain
goods and services whose characteristics indicate that
non-market institutional structures will be more efﬁcient
than using markets, due to the transaction costs
incurred in operating such markets.
Furthermore, the inﬂuence of the ‘institutional logics’
identiﬁed by Tuohy are also important to understanding
how the NHS operates.3 The NHS has a long history of
hierarchical modes of control, which is difﬁcult to
change in a short period of time. Previous research on
the NHS has indicated that the earlier versions of the
quasi-market introduced by the Conservatives in the
1990s and New Labour from 2001 onwards had not
blunted the dominance of hierarchical methods of
coordination despite the introduction of market-like
structures. Checkland et al,40 using theories of new insti-
tutionalism, identiﬁed a lack of ﬁt between the norms
permeating the NHS such as the focus on individual
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patients and seeing the NHS as a common enterprise
and the formal rules of commissioning pushing for
greater marketisation of relationships between different
actors within the health system under the New Labour
version of the quasi-market.41 That study suggested that
hybridity instigated by marketisation of the NHS was
present at that time only at the level of structures, while
norms governing actors’ behaviour remained relatively
unaffected. Our study has shown that this is substantially
true in respect of the third incarnation of the NHS
quasi-market under the HSCA 2012. However, it is
important to note that this is not the whole story.
Checkland et al40 point out that institutional change may
occur in future if commissioning principles become
more embedded in the NHS culture. Our study shows
that there are signs that competitive forces are gradually
taking hold in respect of some more marginal services,
and especially in respect of CHS and MHS. It appears
that it is possible for NHS norms and culture to
change.42
The implications of our study for policymakers are
several. Local commissioners should be allowed to make
their own decisions about which modes of commissioning
are most appropriate in their particular circumstances,
and in respect of particular services. Setting up nationally
imposed rules about what mechanisms must be used is
unhelpful (and probably will not be adhered to). It
appears that in most circumstances, the use of coopera-
tive modes of coordination is likely to be more appropri-
ate. Fortunately, the recent policy developments under
the 5YFV indicate this is the direction of travel. At the
same time, it is important to clarify the rules of the game
for local actors. It may be politically unpalatable, but the
regulatory framework of the HSCA 2012 needs revisiting
to ensure that commissioners have a clear choice about
whether to use competitive mechanisms or not.
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